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reasons 
City of Lapwai's "City") for summary judgment, and, for the reasons stated herein, none 
of the arguments raised in the City's responsive briefing are availing. The District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the City is appropriately reversed. 
A. Mrs. Turner's Notice is Appropriately Examined in the Aggregate. 
The City argues that the three documents provided to the City by Mrs. Turner regarding her 
tort claim cannot be considered in the aggregate for notice purposes, but may only be considered 
individually, in a vacuum. (Respondent's Br., 20-22.) In support of its position, the City cites only 
the fact that Idaho Code § 6-902(7) defines a "claim" as a "written demand", in the singular, as 
dispositive of any ability of a claimant to submit more than one document as part of written notice. 
The City cites no legal authority supporting its position. This position immediately presents glaring 
semantical issues, in addition to being contradictory to Idaho law. Ms. Turner's notice is 
appropriately examined in the aggregate. 
Semantically, the boundaries ofthe City's position are unclear and ill-defined. Presumably, 
the City would not take 
information found on 
a three page claim, delivered at once, with some required 
not required information found on each page, to be 
vias to came 
on a 
it one must 
a 
delivered in three instances over five weeks and relating to one claim, cannot be considered one 
whole written demand, but rather must be delineated and examined as distinct demands. 
By way of an illustration, the City necessarily takes the position that a claimant, injured in 
an auto accident caused by a municipal garbage truck, who writes a demand letter from his hospital 
bed which includes his address but no specific of statement of damages, stating only that medical 
bills and auto repair estimates will follow when available, cannot use the letter and the later bills to 
satisfY the notice requirements of the tort claim act. The letter and the estimates would not be 
delivered simultaneously, but rather at distinct times. The claimant's address, information required 
by the tort claim act, would only be found in the initial letter, while the amount of claimed damages, 
information also required by the tort claim act, would only be found in the medical bills and auto 
repair estimates delivered at a later date. Under the City's analysis, no adequate notice would have 
been provided because the letter and the estimateslbills would have to be examined distinctly and 
each would fail to have the entirety of the required information set forth therein. 
The absurdity of the City's position is readily demonstrated by this example, and was 




to on , 992. lease by 
rent , 1 
January 1993. !d. On May 19, 1993, plaintiff's attorney served a written demand upon the City 
of Sandpoint, demanding payment of the $11,000.00 balance of past due rent, plus interest. Id. The 
plaintiff and the City of Sandpoint attempted to negotiate a resolution, but the negotiations were 
unsuccessful, and the plaintiff again demanded payment ofthe $11 ,000 in past due rent in June 1993. 
!d. The Plaintiff mailed the City of Sandpoint a billing statement for the owed annual rent on August 
1, 1993. Id. The City of Sandpoint refused to pay, stating its objection to the $20,000.00 rental rate. 
Id. Attempts to resolve the dispute in 1996 were unsuccessful. Id. The plaintiff mailed the City of 
Sandpoint an annual billing statement on August 1 of every successive year. Id. 
The plaintiff sued the City of Sandpoint in September of 2001, claiming as damages the 
entirety of the unpaid rent since 1993, as well as accrued interest. Id. The City of Sandpoint moved 
to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to provide adequate notice of the claim as required 
by the Idaho Tort Claim Act ("ITCA"). [d. The plaintiff argued that the May 19, 1993 demand 
letter, in conjunction with the annual billing statements, satisfied the notice requirements. Id. at 131. 
Significantly, the May 19, 1993 demand letter contained no complete statement of the plaintiff's 




on by it rpc'pnrprI no satisfy 
§ 50-219 court reasorlea 9, 
and the annual billing statements, sent to City of Sandpoint over many years, when read in 
conjunction, satisfied the notice requirements of the ITCA because some required information was 
found in the letter, while other required information, such as the accrued interest and payments 
made, and failed to be made, by the City of Sandpoint was found in the annual billing statements: 
Id. 
The letter describes the injury in monetary terms, and includes dates relevant to the alleged 
injury. The letter specifically demands payment of a specific amount with interest due. 
Additionally, the annual billing statements addressed to the City also identify the lease by 
number and the parties to the lease. They track by date the imposition of rent, the accrual 
of interest, the payments made by the city, and, therefore, the city's failure to pay, which is 
the alleged cause ofthe injury. 
Cox stands in direct contravention ofthe City's argument that Mrs. Turner's three documents 
can only be considered separately. The various documents in Cox that cumulatively satisfied the 
ITCA notice requirements spanned at least nine years. Mrs. Turner's three documents were 
submitted over the course of five weeks. The May 19, 1993 letter in Cox did not contain the total 
amount of damages sued for in 2001, but the court nonetheless looked to the annual billing 
statements sent by the plaintiff to the City of Sandpoint order to satisfy that element of tort claim 
was absent from 
v. IS 
BRIEF -7 
two separate U'VL.UUL>lU at 258. Judge 
two to 
lacked such information as the plaintiff's address and the amount of the claimed damages, Judge 
Winmill considered the letters cumulatively. "The Court will therefore consider whether the demand 
letters satisfied the notice of claim requirement. Here, there is no factual dispute about what the 
demand letters say. Thus, the only question is purely legal: whether Brown's demand letters meet 
the applicable notice requirements." !d. at 1263. Judge Winmill did not delineate the two letters and 
consider each one separately; rather, Judge Winmill refers to, and considered, the demand letters 
together, in the plural, ruling that "Brown's demand letters do not meet the applicable notice 
requirements because the letters do not include the statutorily-specified information." Id. 
The District Court in this case also considered Mrs. Turner's notices cumulatively, though 
ultimately deciding that the notices, viewed together, were deficient. At no point did the District 
Court consider each of Mrs. Turner's documents individually and note individual deficiencies 
therewith. "The information in these documents is sufficient for purposes of creating substantial 
actual notice ... However, the letters are deficient for purposes of notice because nothing within the 
documents informs the City specific amounts of reimbursement, vacation, and comp-time pay 
was seeking." Vol. I, p. 124.) "Thus, UV, .. U.LHvJlU0 do not substantially comply 




conducted, it is evident that the District Court erred ruling Mrs. Turner's notices failed to 
satisfy the notice requirements of the Mrs. Turner engaged in this detailed analysis in her 
opening brief and it need not be repeated in its entirety herein, but it is evident from the record that 
Mrs. Turner's notice: (1) stated the amount of her claim (Appellant's Br., 10-12); (2) put the City 
on notice ofa claim for damages against it (Appellant's Br., 12-15); (3) was provided to and received 
by sufficient City officials such that the City had substantial actual notice of her claims (Appellant's 
Br., 16-19); (4) contained her address (Appellant's Br., 19-20); and (5) provided sufficient detail 
regarding her claims against the City (Appellant's Br., 20-22). Furthermore, Mrs. Turner had 
previously submitted to the City her mileage reimbursement requests, a fact noted in her tort claim 
notices. (R Vol. I, pgs. 76, 78.) 
B. Idaho Code § 6-907 Requires "Substance Over Form" Analysis of Tort Claim 
Notices and Shifts the Burden to the Governmental Entity to Demonstrate that it was 
Misled by any Inaccuracies in a Notice of Tort Claim. 
Even if Mrs. Turner's notice was arguably minimally deficient, it is nonetheless saved by the 
"substance over form" analysis mandated by Idaho Code § 6-907, which states in relevant part that 
the provisions of this section shall not invalid or insufficient by reason 
nature or cause or it is 
was 
not even Qn,>n-\,,,y to was at 
it 
Mrs. 
that § 6-907's "savings clause", quoted in the preceding paragraph, cures only inaccuracies in the 
notice content required by § 6-907. (Respondent's Bf., 11.) The City fails to cite any legal authority 
supporting its position, citing only four "critical" points. (Id.) Indeed, the City's proposed limitation 
regarding the reach of § 6-907 is directly contradicted by Idaho law. 
The City's first, third, and fourth "critical" points are functionally equivalent. The City 
argues that if a claimant giving notice under the ITCA fails to satisfy a requirement contained in a 
section of the Act other than § 6-907, then § 6-907 has no bearing on the infirmity and the notice is 
categorically deficient. (Respondent's Bf., 11-12.) Apparently assuming its interpretation of § 6-
907 to be controlling, the City ignores Idaho law directly contradicting this assertion. In Huff v. Uhi, 
103 Idaho 274 (1982), the Minidoka Irrigation District argued that the claimant's alleged tort claim, 
inter alia, "was not a 'written demand' as required under I.C. § 6-902(7) because the writing itself 
did not contain a statement of demand upon M.LD., ... " !d. at 276. The Supreme Court discussed 
the application of § 6-907 in Smith v. Preston, 99 Idaho 618 (1978), before applying § 6-907 to the 
M.LD.' s claim of infirmity under § 6-902(7): "[A ]lthough the written estimate itself did not contain 




IS to an 
the Idaho '---'HUH."'> Act other than § specifically, § 6-902(7). The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed Huffs application of § 6-907 to an alleged infirmity under § 6-902(7) in Mitchell v. 
Bingham Mem. Hasp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997) : "Although not expressly a "written demand" pursuant 
to I.C. § 6-902(7), a written estimate of damages [in HujJJ was held to provide sufficient notice of 
a tort claim because it contained enough information to alert the governmental agency that a claim 
was being prosecuted against it." Id. at 424. 
In Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484 (1994), the Idaho Supreme Court again 
contradicted the City's interpretation of § 6-907: "This Court has applied [§ 6-907] to allow tort 
claims against governmental defendants where the notice filed with that entity did not conform with 
all of the ITCA requirements." !d. at 487 (emphasis added). The Court unequivocally stated that 
§ 6-907 may potentially cure a failure to conform with "all of the requirements" of the ITCA. Id. 
Contrary to the City's interpretation, the Court did not limit § 6-907's application to that section's 
requirements. 
City's second "critical" point with regards to § 6-907's "savings clause" is the City's 




claims, instead attacking the 
not 
not even attempt to argue that it was misled by Mrs. Turner's 
"substance over form" analysis mandated by Smith v. Preston, 
99 Idaho 618, 621 (1978) ("Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not comply with 
all the requirements enumerated in § 6-907, we believe the contents of the letter were adequate .. 
. to notify the city that a claim against it was being pursued and to apprise the city of sufficient facts 
for it to investigate the matter, determine its merits and prepare a defense" ), and Huff v. Uhf, 103 
Idaho 274, 276 (1982) ("[A]lthough the written estimate itself did not contain a statement of 
demand, M.LD. was clearly apprised of the fact that a claim was being prosecuted against it, and the 
amount thereof."), which are both still good law in Idaho. 
The City cites several cases that supposedly undermine the "substance over form" analysis 
of Smith and Huff, but with each of these cases the City ignores how readily distinguishable they are 
from the facts of this case. 











personally and directly provided notice of her own claim; she did not attempt to adopt as own 
any notice provided by an independent third party. 
Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745 (1995), is similarly easily distinguishable. In Avila, a 
claimant who suffered injuries in an auto accident provided zero notice to any governmental entity 
until after the expiry of the 180 day limitations period set forth in § 6-908. Id. at 748. The claimant 
attempted to rely on the fact that the governmental entity conducted its own independently-initiated 
investigation into the subject auto accident in order to satisfY the notice requirement. Id. The court 
rejected this argument based on the claimant's lack of proactivity. Id. By contrast, in this case Mrs. 
Turner relies on her own pro activity in the form ofthe three notices she timely provided to the City, 
and does not attempt to rely on any independent investigation solely initiated by the City. 
In Friel v. Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484 (1994), a claimant who slipped and fell 
on ice at an apartment complex owned by the Boise City Housing Authority ("BCHA") only 
provided oral notice to one employee at the apartment complex and submitted medical bills 
directly to BCHA's insurer. !d. at 485. claimant provided no written notice to the BCHA in 
court statement to BCHA employee was LUW"''',"! 
f"".HP'C1PT no was statement 
to a 
case, to § 
does not am~ml:n to on to an 
. . 
msurance carner. Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho 523 (1 the claimants, heirs of an elderly 
gentleman that perished in a fire that destroyed a building owned by a third party, sued both the third 
party owners of the building and the Buhl fire chief. Id. at 525. Prior to the filing ofthe suit, the 
third party owners' insurer, acting through a business services corporation, sent a letter to the Buhl 
city clerk stating that the claimants had brought a claim against the third party owners, and that Buhl 
could be liable in subrogation and indemnification therefor. !d. at 528. The court ruled that this 
letter failed to satisfY the notice requirements of the ITCA because it was not sent by the claimants 
and "[n]o ... special relationship exists between [the insurer or the business services corporation] 
and plaintiffs." Id. at 532. Furthennore, the court noted that the letter, at most, gave notice of a 
potential claim by the third party owners, and gave no notice of any claim by the claimant heirs 
themselves: "One could infer from this letter that [the insurer] possibly intended to seek 
indemnification from the City of Buhl if it were liable on the plaintiffs' claim ... At best, this letter 
infonned the City of Buhl of an insurance claim made by the plaintiffs against Ranger Insurance 
Company ... Even if the ... letter were, somehow, claim against the City, it is not notice 




cases delLllonsltra1te IS a engages case 
case, ",\C'T<lrlf'A over to a case 
substantially complied with the notice requirements Far from ,-un . .<VUHHLHL6 Smith and Huff, 
the cases cited by the City are prime examples of application of their "substance over form" analysis. 
The City suggests that just because in some cases provided notice is deemed insufficient, it 
undermines the analytical framework used to arrive at that conclusion. To the contrary, the 
analytical "substance over form" framework set forth in Huff and Smith is sound, and for the reasons 
discussed supra, the facts of this case differ substantially from those cases in which notice was 
reasonably found lacking. 
Furthermore, the City has not even attempted to demonstrate that it was misled with regards 
to Mrs. Turner's claim, as it rationally cannot in light ofthat fact that the City paid a portion of Mrs. 
Turner's claim, as well as Mayor Hernandez's letter of March 21,2011 informing Mrs. Turner that 
her claim was being reviewed and an outside accounting service being hired. (R Vol. I, p. 80.) 
C. The City Cannot Carry its Burden to Demonstrate that it was in Fact Misled by 
Virtue of the Identity of the Deliveree of Mrs. Turner's Notice. 
The City argues that the fact that Mrs. Turner gave notice directly to the Mayor and a City 
Councillor, and the notice was substantively acted IS because the letter of § 6-906 
to a city or 
, cannot it was 
IS 
received notice of Mrs. Turner's claims. (Respondent's 18-1 argument Ignores 
the chronology of events that actually transpired regards to Mrs. Turner's claim. On January 
20,2011 Ms. Turner submitted a check request for the full amounts owed her upon the termination 
of her employment with the City. (R Vol. I, p. 64, ~ll; R Vol. I, pp. 66-74.) On February 1,2011 
Ms. Turner submitted a follow-up letter to Mayor Ricky Hernandez regarding her final check request 
and the amounts she was still owed by the City. (R Vol. I, p. 64, ~13; R Vol. I, p. 76.) On February 
2,2011 the City paid Ms. Turner for the 84 hours of wages, but failed to pay the rest ofthe amounts 
owed to Ms. Turner. (R Vol. I, p. 64, ~12; R Vol. I, p. 75.) On February 28,2011 Mrs. Turner 
submitted a follow-up letter to City Councillor Antonio Smith regarding the amounts she was still 
owed by the City. (R Vol. I, p. 64, ~14; R Vol. I, pp. 77-79.) On March 21, 2011 Mayor Hernandez 
wrote Ms. Turner and informed her that the "City of Lapwai is currently reviewing your final request 
for reimbursement of comprehensive time and other reimbursable items." Vol. I, p. 64, ~15; R 
Vol. I, p. 80.) 
City, by arguing that there is no evidence Mrs. claim reached the relevant 
decision-makers, ignores the undisputed fact on 
2, a 
BRIEF -
was to a 
VH!ULUUVLwasreSLCh!ed, 
Furthennore, Idaho law has established that "substance over fonn" analysis applies to 
compliance with § 6-906. In Huff v. Uhf, notice was given to the receptionist at the governmental 
entity's office, not the secretary thereof personally, and this technical deficiency was deemed 
inconsequential based on the "substance over fonn" analysis mandated by § 6-907. 103 Idaho at 
276-77. Similarly, in Cox v. Sandpoint, notice that was ruled adequate was generally addressed to 
the "City of Sandpoint", not specifically to the clerk ofthe City of Sandpoint. 140 Idaho at 132. In 
both cases the technical deficiency was deemed inconsequential because the notice was provided 
such that it could be, and in fact was, acted upon by the appropriatc decision-makers, as the notice 
was in this case as well. 
Because Mrs. Turner's claim was partially paid and partially rej ected, there can be no dispute 
that notice of Mrs. Turner's clam reached the appropriate decision-makers at the City and Mrs. 
Turner substantively complied with § 6-906. The City cannot carry its burden under § 6-907 to 





right to U"",,,,,,,WVU0 regarding ,-,LUjan,:} 
to 
Consider an illustrative hypothetical scenario. '-' ... 'UU<.UH submits a notice of a substantively 
viable tort claim to the clerk of any Idaho city. The notice is written, delivered to the clerk 165 days 
after the injury, and contains all the information required by § 6-907, except that it provides only the 
claimant's email address and omits the claimant's physical address. This notice is technically 
defective because it omits the claimant's physical address. l The hypothetical city, noticing the 
infirmity in the claimant's notice and knowing it has 90 days to respond thereto in accordance with 
§ 6-909, takes no action. The city shrewdly never reaches out to the claimant to infonn him of the 
infirmity, nor does the city make any affirmative representation or promise to the claimant that the 
notice satisfies the ITCA or the city is otherwise waiving compliance therewith. In accordance with 
§ 6-909, after 90 days have elapsed with no response from the city, the claimant understands his 
claim to have been denied and the claimant files suit. The city responds with a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that the claimant's notice, by virtue of the omitted physical address, failed to satisfy the 
notice requirements ofthe ITCA. The motion to dismiss is granted based on the technical deficiency 
of omitted address. What recourse does the claimant now possess? The court 
judicially city's of his claim, 80 day period to a 
a 
- 8 
........ 'VH.H reVIew, 
to 
foregoing hypothetical cannot be the intended functioning of the ITCA. Indeed, one 
the primary goals of the ITCA is the "amicable resolution of the differences between parties". 
Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27 (1991). It is recognized that a reasonable burden must 
be placed on a claimant to understand the ITCA and its filing requirements, but substantial, good 
faith attempts at compliance by often unrepresented claimants, such as those efforts so clearly 
exhibited by Mrs. Turner, should not be so easily and insurmountably insulated fromjudicial review 
by virtue of inaction, or even affirmatively misleading conduct, on the part of governmental entities. 
In Mrs. Turner's case, when Mayor Hernandez wrote Ms. Turner and updated her regarding 
the status ofher claim, it could not have been more evident that the City was speciously treating Mrs. 
Turner's notice regarding her claim as sufficient and that her claim was being substantively 
considered and investigated by the City: 
This letter is to inform you that the City of Lapwai is currently reviewing your final 
request for reimbursement of comprehensive time and other reimbursable items. The City 
has retained an outside accounting service to assist in our review of your request. To date, 
we have provided you with the amount that is not in dispute, but until the completion of this 






denial of her claim is thus impervious, unassailable, bulletproof, and otherwise insulated from 
judicial review or oversight. It is the height inequity, even arrogance, undoubtedly 
inconsistent with the intent of the ITCA, for the City to give Mrs. Turner every indication through 
its actions that it considered her provided notice sufficient and that her claim was being substantively 
investigated and resolved, only for the City to deem her notice insufficient after the time to re-file 
notice of her claim has expired, and thereby foreclose any review of her claim. 
E. Mrs. Turner's Claim is Governed by the Two Year Limitations Period Set Forth in 
Idaho Code § 45-614. 
The District Court declined to consider the City's argument that Mrs. Turner's complaint was 
untimely. (R Vol I, p. 119.) Thus, the parties have no benefit ofa ruling regarding this argument, 
but the City nonetheless reiterates its meritless argument on this point. Mrs. Turner's claim for 
unpaid compensatory and vacation time is governed by the two year limitations period set forth in 
Idaho Code § 45-614. That section states: 
Any person shall have the right to collect wages, penalties and liquidated damages provided 
by any law or pursuant to a contract of employment, but any action thereon shall be filed 
either with the department or commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within two (2) 
years after the cause of action accrued, provided, however, the event salary or wages 
have to any employee and such employee claims additional 
§ to wages 
case. 
Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Idaho 2011), a federal district court case that has not been cited by 
any Idaho state court. In Wood, the plaintiff sued for unpaid, accrued vacation time and the court 
ruled that § 45-614's six month limitations period applied. Id. at 1085-87. Mrs. Turner's claim, 
however, is readily distinguishable from the claim presented by the plaintiff in Wood. In Wood, the 
court noted that "Presumably, Wood therefore had the right to demand his accrued but unused 
vacation pay at the conclusion of each year, again mandating application of the six month statute of 
limitations period." Id. at 1087. By contrast, Mrs. Turner had no right to demand payment for 
accrued compensatory and vacation time at any point during her employment. (R Vol. I, p. 63 ~ 5.) 
Indeed, the City concurs that Mrs. Turner "had a legal entitlement to be paid any wages" only "on 
her last day of employment, January 20,2011." (Respondent's Br., 34.) 
As both parties agree that Mrs. Turner only had an entitlement to be paid for her accrued 
compensatory and vacation time in a lump sum, at the conclusion of her employment, the question 
thus becomes how to characterize that payment, and thus determine whether § 45-614's six-month 
or two year limitations period applies. Ifthat lump sum payment constitutes a wage attributable to 
a specific pay _Tnnn,-n period applies. If, however, that lump sum payment constitutes 




an annual bonus of25% defendant's net profits, due on the last day of each year. Id. at 338. 
The plaintiff sued 1965 to recover the bonus owed him for 1963, and the defendant argued that 
the six-month limitations period barred the claim. !d. at 342. The salary and bonus together covered 
a defined pay period, one calendar year, and constituted payment for services rendered within that 
defined pay period, but the Court nonetheless ruled that the two year limitations period applied and 
the plaintiffs claim was timely. Id. "It follows that plaintiffs full compensation for each year of 
the employment was $8,700.00, plus 25% of the profits. The semimonthly payments were payments 
on account and did not purport to be full payment for the yearly pay period ... the semimonthly 
payments made during that year were partial payments on account for services rendered during that 
year." Id. 
Thomas is directly on point. Mrs. Turner's full, agreed compensation with the City consisted 
ofbi-weekly paychecks, as well as compensatory and vacation time payable upon termination of her 
employment. (R Vol. I, p. 63 ~ 5.) Mrs. Turner's bi-weekly paychecks were thus partial payments 
on account for services because, as the City readily admits, Mrs. Turner had no right to be 




to § two 
and not the six-month limitations period as found in Wood to be applicable to compensation owed 
for a calendar year. Both the Wood plaintiff and the Thomas plaintiff had the right to demand 
payment at the conclusion of the year for services rendered therein. The Wood court applied § 45-
614's six month limitations period, while theThomas court applied § 45-614's two year limitations 
period. Thomas is Idaho Supreme Court precedent; Wood is not. 
Similarly, in Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled 
that severance pay implicated the two year limitations period because "severance pay is not 
attributed to, or earned in a specific pay period, but, is earned over the entire course of the 
employment relationship." Jd. at 367. Mrs. Turner's termination payment of compensatory and 
vacation time is analogous to severance pay because it was earned, and grew, over the course of her 
employment relationship with the City and, like severance pay, she had no right to demand it prior 
to the termination of her employment relationship. Furthermore, severance pay grows the longer an 
employee works for a specific employer; severance pay to a twenty year employee exceeds the 
severance pay given to a two year employee. Notwithstanding the fact that severance pay, like Mrs. 
Turner's termination payment, grows service, such a payment is not attributable 
to a 
§ 14's two-
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Idaho 708, 710 986). See also 3A SUTHERLAND CONST. § 70.03, pp. 493-94 (4th ed. 
1986); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1981) (statutes oflimitation 
prescribing a relatively short period of time in which to commence an action are usually construed 
narrowly to give the party a fair opportunity to present the claim); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling Ltd., 218 
Mont. 201, 710 P.2d 33 (1985) (longest of two conflicting statutes oflimitation shall apply). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, the District Court erred in granting the 
City's motion for summary judgment, and, for the reasons stated herein, none of the arguments 
raised in the City's responsive briefing are availing. The District Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City is appropriately reversed. 
DATED this It.~4ay of May , 2014. 
BRASSEY, CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC 
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